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MAPPING PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW:
STILL A "ROAD TO NOWHERE*
Rachel A. Van Cleave**
I. INTRODUCTION
With three decisions in its 2002-2003 Term, the United States Supreme Court
made clear that there is a constitutional sound-wall between the two distinct roads it had
previously paved for proportionality review of terms of imprisonment and of civil
punitive damages for possible excessiveness. l These decisions resulted in essentially no
proportionality review of terms of imprisonment but careful scrutiny of punitive damages
awards. In Ewing v. California, the Court upheld against an Eighth Amendment
proportionality challenge a life sentence with a possibility of parole in twenty-five years
for the theft of $1,200 worth of golf clubs.2  The Court upheld a similar sentence
imposed pursuant to the same California statute on the grounds that the defendant failed
to meet the standards for habeas corpus review in Lockyer v. Andrade.3 While
narrowing proportionality review, both substantively and procedurally, in these two
criminal cases, the Court gave further traction to its vigilant review of punitive damages
awards in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell.4 This paper considers
another trio of cases related to imposition of punishments decided during the 2006-2007
Term, again two criminal cases and one civil punitive damages case.
During its 2006-2007 Term, the Court continued its role as a federal tort reformer
* BMW ofN.A. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 605 (1996) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
** Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. Several commentators have analyzed and criticized the Court's inconsistent approaches to
proportionality review. See e.g. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1049
(2004) (comparing the Supreme Court's review of terms of imprisonment with that of punitive damages
awards); Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines ": The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal
Punishments, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 880 (2004); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right against Excessive
Punishment, 91 Va. L. Rev. 677 (2005) (comparing Supreme Court decisions deciding when the death penalty
is disproportionate with cases considering the proportionality of terms of imprisonment); K.G. Jan Pillai,
Incongruent Disproportionality, 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 645 (2002) (comparing the meaning of
proportionality under the Cruel and Unusual and Excessive Fines Clauses of the Eighth Amendment, as well as
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause under the Fifth
Amendment); Rachel A. Van Cleave, "Death is Different," Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments,
Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages-Shifting Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. Cal. Interdisc.
L.J. 217, 222 n. 26 (2003) (comparing review of the four forms of punishment listed in the title and noting
other scholarly works comparing review of two or three of these punishments).
2. 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003).
3. 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003).
4. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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by vacating a $79.5 million punitive damages award against Philip Morris,5 based on a
mystifying nuance regarding the reprehensibility guidepost, discussed below in Part II.
This Term did not involve Eighth Amendment challenges to terms of imprisonment.
However, it produced opinions that continue the Court's Apprendi v. New Jersey6 and
United States v. Booker7 line of cases concerning criminal sentencing schemes and the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right. In Cunningham v. California the Court found
California's determinate sentencing scheme constitutionally defective to the extent that it
mandates a higher sentence based on factual findings made by a judge rather than by a
jury. 8 The Court's analysis highlights the subtlety of a distinction made in its Booker
remedy that rendered the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory
to cure the Sixth Amendment defect. Another part of the Booker remedy did away with
de novo review of sentences and the Court opted instead for the more deferential
standard of reasonableness. In the third case involving criminal punishments, Rita v.
United States, the Court held that federal appellate courts may accord a presumption of
reasonableness to sentences within the Guidelines range, even when the sentencing judge
provided little explanation for the sentence.
9
This article examines how a majority of the Supreme Court went out of its way to
vacate a punitive damages award in Philip Morris and further reinforced the
inconsistency with which it applies the principle of proportionality. When it comes to
punitive damages awards, a majority of Justices continue to convey distrust of juries and
of trial and appellate court judges who review these awards. 10 However, when it comes
to terms of imprisonment, the Court has eschewed substantive review under the Eighth
Amendment while insisting that the Sixth Amendment requires that all facts supporting
an increase in a sentence be found by a jury, and insists upon a deferential review of
terms of imprisonment imposed by federal courts, thus expressing much greater trust of
juries and judges in the criminal context, perhaps. The Court's opinion in Rita raises the
question of the extent to which the jury's verdict is, as a practical matter, relevant to the
sentencing determination under the now advisory Federal Guidelines. Indeed, it seems
that a common result of these cases is to reduce the role of the jury as to both punitive
damages awards and as to federal sentencing. Despite this similarity, the Supreme Court
continues to carefully scrutinize punitive damages awards, while prison sentences remain
within the province of the United States Sentencing Commission and the sentencing
judges, subject to a reasonableness standard on review.
First, this article summarizes the jurisprudence that has federalized punitive
damages awards and explains what the Philip Morris decision has added to this analysis.
Next, the article turns to a summary of how the Court's application of proportionality
review of terms of imprisonment has resulted in only a theoretical possibility that the
Court might find a prison term grossly disproportionate. To explain the significance of
5. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
6. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
7. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
8. 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
9. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
10. Chemerinsky, supra n. 1, at 1069.
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Cunningham and Rita, the third part of this article reviews the Apprendi and Booker line
of cases. Finally, this article looks forward to cases currently pending before the Court
that raise, yet again, questions of proportionality. Specifically, the Exxon Valdez case
challenging the $2.5 billion in punitive damages imposed by the Ninth Circuit,11 and
State v. Kennedy, testing the constitutionality of a Louisiana law that allows a jury to
impose the death penalty for the crime of aggravated rape when no death occurred. 12
While the two cases pending before the Court may give the Court an opportunity to
resolve, or at least explain, the inconsistencies in its proportionality principle, something
this author has previously called for, 13 it is more likely that the Court will continue its
separate and distinct lines of analysis in reviewing the different forms of punishment.
II. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
A majority of Supreme Court Justices have only recently accepted the idea that the
Constitution places limits on punitive damages awards. In 1989, the Court concluded
that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not impose a
proportionality requirement on punitive damages awards. 14 The Court determined that
the Eighth Amendment addresses only "direct actions initiated by government to inflict
punishment" and not "punitive damages in cases between private parties."'15 In reaching
this decision, the Court relied on a civil-criminal dichotomy that, like most dichotomies,
greatly oversimplifies the value of such a distinction.16 Indeed, only twelve years later,
the Court described punitive damages awards as "quasi-criminal" punishments rather
than factual findings to be made by a jury. 17 In 1991 and 1993, the Court changed its
view on constitutional limits on punitive damages and relied on the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to create a constitutional line that punitive damages
awards may not cross. 18  However, in both cases it examined, Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip and TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the
Court concluded that the punitive damages awards were not "grossly excessive."
19
By contrast to the abundance of judicial attention given to the question of whether
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment includes a
proportionality principle, the Court has provided little to no basis for its conclusion that
the Due Process Clause caps punitive damages awards. To the extent that the Court
It. 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), modified, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, Exxon Ship. Co. v.
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 492 (2007).
12. 957 So. 2d 757, 779 (2007), cert. granted, Kennedy v. La., 128 S. Ct. 829 (2008).
13. Van Cleave, supra n. 1, at 272-78.
14. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
15. Id. at 260.
16. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness
Jurisprudence, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1085, 1135 (2006) (criticizing this analysis for violating canons of
constitutional construction); Van Cleave, supra n. 1, at 246-48 (describing how the Court rejected this
dichotomy in cases challenging forfeitures of property for unconstitutional excessiveness).
17. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (quoting P. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991)).
18. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); P. Mut., 499 U.S. at 1.
19. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 462; P. Mut., 499 U.S. at 19.
20. For an excellent examination of the fundamental flaw in this line of cases, see Spencer, supra n. 16
(inspecting cases cited by Justices who have espoused the view that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
2008]
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has provided a constitutional basis for limiting punitive damages awards, former Justice
O'Connor relied on the one case in which the Court found an imprisonment term
unconstitutional in Solem v. Helm,2 I stating that:
Judicial intervention in cases of excessive [punitive damages] awards also has the critical
function of ensuring that another ancient and fundamental principle of justice is
observed-that the punishment be proportionate to the offense. As we have observed, the
requirement of proportionality is "deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law
jurisprudence. 2
The jurisprudential paths of constitutional proportionality crossed briefly when a
majority of the Court was in the early stages of attempting to establish a constitutional
toe-hold for a limit on punitive damages awards. 23 In Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., the Court cited cases in which the Court found imposition
of the death penalty unconstitutional, 24 a case ruling that a life sentence for writing a bad
check was disproportionate even when committed by a repeat offender, 25 and a case
finding the forfeiture of $357,144 grossly disproportional to the offense of failing to
report bringing this amount of money into the country. 26 Remarkably, this string of
citations in Cooper Industries did not include Harmelin v. Michigan which, only a
decade earlier, had all but gutted proportionality review for terms of imprisonment. 27 In
addition, Harmelin significantly altered the method for reviewing prison terms under the
Eighth Amendment, relying on the need to defer to state legislatures' determinations of
appropriate punishments.2 8 By contrast, in Cooper Industries, the Court adopted a
standard of de novo review of punitive damages awards, 29 thereby broadening judicial
review for possible excessiveness. Subsequently, the Court continued to increase the
scope of this review, both substantively and procedurally. In addition to providing for de
novo review, the Court also required states to create post-verdict procedures to review
punitive damages awards for possible excessiveness.
30
As to substantive review of punitive damages awards, shortly after federalizing an
excessiveness limit on punitive damages awards, the Court invalidated a punitive
damages award of $2 million dollars in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,3 1 setting
prohibits excessive punitive damages awards and concluding that these cases do not support this conclusion).
21. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
22. TXO Prod Corp., 509 U.S. at 478 (O'Connor, White & Souter, JJ., concurring in parts 11-B-2, II-C, III,
and dissenting from part IV) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 284). See also Van Cleave, supra n. 1, at 267-68
(quoting other dissenting opinions of Justice O'Connor in which she supports her assertion that Due Process
protects civil defendants from excessive punitive damages awards by relying on criminal cases and principles).
23. See Pillai, supra n. 1, at 678-79, n. 209 (describing the Court's multiple citations in Cooper Industries
to a "quintet" of cases, all but one of which involved criminal punishments struck by the Court as "grossly
disproportionate" or "excessive").
24. 532 U.S. at 434 (citing Enmund v. Fla., 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (death penalty is excessive when the
defendant had not actively participated in the killing); Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (death penalty is
grossly disproportionate to the crime of rape)).
25. Id. (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 303).
26. Id. (citing U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998)).
27. Harmelin v. Mich., 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
28. Id. at 994-96.
29. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436.
30. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,434-35 (1994).
31. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
[Vol. 43:709
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out three guideposts for courts evaluating punitive damages awards. 32 These guideposts
are the "reprehensibility of the [defendant's conduct]; the disparity between the harm or
potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff] and [the] punitive damages award; and the
difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases." 33 The Court in BMW pointed out that reprehensibility is the "most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award," yet, the Court
accorded no deference to a jury's determination that $4 million in punitive damages were
warranted and the reviewing court's conclusion that the evidence supported a finding of
egregious conduct by the defendant. 34 Instead, the Court characterized BMW's conduct
of selling a repainted car as if it were a new car, as a mere failure to disclose that resulted
in "purely economic" harm.
35
The Court expanded on the factors relevant to evaluating the reprehensibility of a
defendant's conduct in State Farm, in which the Court struck down a punitive damages
award of $145 million. 36  In State Farm, the Court stated that an evaluation of the
defendant's reprehensibility should include consideration of
whether.., the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target
of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or
mere accident.
3 7
The Court also made clear that state courts may not allow punitive damages awards that
seek to punish a defendant's lawful conduct in other states. Furthermore, when a jury
considers other conduct of the defendant to evaluate its egregiousness, such "conduct
must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff.",
3 8
The second guidepost has been dubbed the "ratio guidepost" since the focus of this
has been on the ratio between the compensatory damages and the punitive damages. 39 In
BMW, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $4,000 and punitive damages of $4
million, which the Alabama Supreme Court reduced to $2 million. While the Court
purported to eschew any bright line or mathematical formula for evaluating the
32. At least one commentator speculated that the BMW decision might result in enhanced constitutional
scrutiny of prison terms. Evan P. Schultz, Crime and Punitives, 25 Leg. Times 60 (Apr. 15, 2002) (discussing
how the $4 million dollar award may aid California inmates).
33. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
34. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the jury award to $2 million because the court concluded that
the jury had improperly calculated punitive damages based on similar sales by BMW that had occurred in states
other than Alabama. Id. at 567 (citing BMWofN.A. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (1994)).
35. Id. at 576.
36. 538 U.S. at 429.
37. ld. at 419.
38. Id. at 422.
39. Id. at 427. For criticism of this guidepost as having little to no relevance to the issue of appropriate
punitive damages awards, see Spencer, supra n. 16, at 1098 (explaining that comparing the harm suffered to the
punitive damages awarded is both subjective and subject to manipulation). For an analysis of how the ratio
guidepost has proved problematic for plaintiffs in civil rights cases where the compensatory damages may be
very small or nothing, see Caprice L. Roberts, Ratios, (Ir)rationality & Civil Rights Punitive Awards, 39 Akron
L. Rev. 1019 (2006).
40. 517 U.S. at 565-67.
2008]
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constitutionality of a punitive damages award, it nonetheless concluded that "[w]hen the
ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1, however, the award must surely 'raise a suspicious
judicial eyebrow."' 4 In State Farm, the Court moved closer to a bright line numerical
formula when it stated that "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with
due process.' '42 The Court further concluded that it had "no doubt that there is a
presumption against an award that has a 145-to-I ratio.
4 3
The Court's third guidepost imposes a comparative analysis, something the Court
specifically rejected when evaluating criminal prison terms in Harmelin, unless a
reviewing court determines, as a threshold matter, that a term of imprisonment is
"grossly disproportionate. '"4 4 In BMW, however, the Court compared the $2 million
punitive damages award to the maximum fine of $2,000 allowed under the state's
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the possible civil penalties in other states that ranged
from $50 for a first offense to the most severe penalty of $10,000. 45 In State Farm, the
Court clarified that this guidepost is not intended to permit civil punitive damages
awards to assess criminal penalties since these "can be imposed only after the heightened
protections of a criminal trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher
standards of proof"4 6 In any event, the Court concluded that the likely civil sanction
which could be imposed under state law, $10,000, was "dwarfed by the $145 million
punitive damages award." 47 The Court ultimately characterized the punitive damages
award not only as not "reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed" but as "an
irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.
'48
Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority opinion in State Farm for not taking into
account all of the facts related to the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and for
transforming the guideposts into "marching orders.
' ' 9
In the 2006-2007 Term, the Court continued its involvement in tort reform by
signaling to lower courts that they must carefully guard against the possibility that juries
might assess punitive damages contrary to the Constitution. In Philip Morris, a jury
found that the defendant, the manufacturer of Marlboro cigarettes, was negligent and had
engaged in deceit that led the decedent, Jesse Williams, to believe that smoking was
safe. 50 As to the deceit claim, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $821,000 and
punitive damages of $79.5 million. 5 1 Although the trial court reduced the punitive
41. Id. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod Corp., 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, White & Souter, JJ., concurring in
parts I1-B-2, II-C, Ill, and dissenting from part IV)).
42. 538 U.S. at 425.
43. Id. at 426.
44. 501 U.S. at 1001 (upholding a life sentence without the possibility of parole for first-time drug
possession offense, concluding that the sentence was not "grossly disproportionate"). See infra nn. 68-69 and
accompanying text.
45. 517 U.S. at 584.
46. 538 U.S. at 428.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 429.
49. Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
50. 127 S. Ct. at 1060-61.
51. Id. at 1061.
[Vol. 43:709
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52damages award to $32 million, the Oregon Supreme Court reinstated the jury award.
The Supreme Court vacated this award based on a "nuanced ' 53 distinction. The Court
stated that in assessing reprehensibility, a jury may consider the effect of the defendant's
conduct on others, but a jury cannot punish the defendant directly for such harm. 54 In
BAW and State Farm, the Court listed as one of the factors relevant to the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct whether "the tortious conduct evinced an
indifference to or reckless disregard of the health or safety of others,' 55 yet Philip
Morris attempts to distinguish this from directly punishing the defendant for harm
suffered by others. 56 Justice Steven's characterization of this "nuance" is generous-it
simply makes no sense at all. This distinction is even more elusive when one considers
the specifics of what occurred at trial. The Oregon trial court did not tell the jury to
calculate punitive damages in a manner that would punish Philip Morris directly for
harm suffered by strangers to the litigation. Indeed, the majority appears to acknowledge
this. Nonetheless, the Court concluded "that state courts cannot authorize procedures
that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk" that the jury may seek to punish the
defendant for harm inflicted on others. 5 7 It is not clear what the trial court did to violate
this principle, since the Court did not hold that the trial court should have given the jury
instruction that Philip Morris requested.
In addition, the Court vacated the punitive damages award despite the fact that
Philip Morris did not preserve its objections to the trial court's instruction to the jury, to
58statements by plaintiffs counsel, or to evidence introduced at trial. As Justice
Ginsburg pointed out, Philip Morris preserved its objection only to the trial court's
refusal to give its proposed instruction, yet the majority did not evaluate the trial court's
refusal to give this instruction.59 Nor did the Court conclude that the instructions given
by the trial court amounted to an incorrect statement of the law. 60 Rather, the Court
noted that states must have procedures that guard against the risk that a jury might
impose punitive damages to punish the defendant directly for harm suffered by strangers
to the litigation.6 1 Certainly, it is difficult to object to such a statement in the abstract,
but when considered in the context of this case, it is not at all clear how trial courts are to
implement this mandate.
Philip Morris thus demonstrates the lengths to which a majority of the Court will
go in its continued effort to expand federal constitutional review of punitive damages
awards-by invoking mystifying distinctions and by ignoring basic appellate procedural
rules. While the Court did not evaluate the specific punitive damages award under the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting, stating that "this nuance eludes [him]").
54. Id. at 1063 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424).
55. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added).
56. 127 S. Ct. at 1063-65.
57. Id. at 1065.
58. Id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1068-69.
60. The trial court instructed the jury that "punitive damages are awarded against a defendant to punish
misconduct and to deter misconduct... [they] are not intended to compensate the plaintiff or anyone else for
damages caused by the defendant's conduct." Id. at 1061.
61. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.
2008]
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BMW and State Farm factors, the procedural ruling in Philip Morris makes evident the
degree of vigilance the Court wishes to see lower courts and state supreme courts
exercise when reviewing punitive damages awards.
11. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT
By contrast to the substantive and procedural scrutiny to which the Supreme Court
subjects punitive damages awards, the Court has severely curtailed review of terms of
imprisonment for excessiveness. In Solem, the only case in which the Court has found a
prison term in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment with no possibility of parole for a seventh non-violent offense. 62 The
Court set out an analysis for evaluating a criminal sentence for proportionality. First, a
court should consider the seriousness of the offense as compared to the severity of the
sentence. 63 This is not an entirely objective factor since the Court stated that this also
includes an evaluation of the defendant's culpability. 64 The Court also considered two
forms of comparative analysis. The first is an intra-jurisdictional comparison of
"sentences imposed on other defendants in the same jurisdiction" compared to the
sentence the defendant received. 65  This comparison considers the "gradation of
punishment." 6 6  The second form of comparative analysis involves comparing the
sentences imposed for similar offenses in other jurisdictions; an inter-jurisdictional
analysis.
67
In Harmelin, Justice Kennedy rendered the comparative analysis discretionary.
68
This opinion recognized that a proportionality principle applied to prison terms, but
stated that a reviewing court should compare the gravity of the offense to the severity of
the penalty and engage in the intra and inter-jurisdictional comparative analysis
described in Solem "only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."
69
In effect, the crime must be so innocuous and the punishment so severe for the court to
engage in the comparative analysis. As one commentator has described this threshold
approach, "it invokes the image of taking a particular crime and a particular punishment
and setting them against each other, without regard to how other crimes are punished. ,
70
Thus, Justice Kennedy rejected any comparative analysis of the prison term unless a
court concluded that the sentence was "grossly disproportionate" in the abstract. The
Court concluded that a life sentence for a first-time conviction for possession of a large
amount of cocaine was not "grossly disproportionate" due to the seriousness of drug
62. 463 U.S. 277.
63. Id. at290-91.
64. Id. at 291.
65. Id.
66. Van Cleave, supra n. 1, at 239.
67. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
68. 501 U.S. at 1004 (Kennedy, O'Conner & Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment);
see Lee, supra n. 1, at 693 (describing the lack of a majority opinion in Harmelin, but stating that Justice
Kennedy's opinion "came to assume the status of law").
69. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, O'Conner & Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
70. Lee, supra n. I, at 695-96.
[Vol. 43:709
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Twelve years later, in Ewing, most of the Justices agreed with the framework for
evaluating the proportionality of terms of imprisonment set out by Justice Kennedy in
Harmelin, but they disagreed as to its application in this case. Applying this "threshold"
inquiry of whether a prison term is "grossly disproportionate" in Ewing, the Court relied
not on the seriousness of the offense, shoplifting three golf clubs, but on the seriousness
of recidivism, to conclude that a life sentence with the possibility of parole in twenty-five
years is not "grossly disproportionate" when imposed on a repeat offender of theft
offenses.
72
The lack of substantive proportionality review in these imprisonment cases is in
stark contrast to the scrutiny with which the Court reviews punitive damages awards.
While in State Farm and BMW the Court emphasized the fact that the harms involved
were purely economic rather than physical, the Court in Ewing did not attach the same
relevance to the fact that property theft rather than violent crime was involved.
The Court's inconsistency becomes even clearer once its approach to the death
penalty is considered. In capital cases, the Court engages in a comparative analysis
without first determining that a sentence of death is "grossly disproportionate" in the
abstract. Although a detailed analysis of proportionality in capital offenses is beyond the
scope of this paper, several commentators have criticized the Court for recognizing a
proportionality principle as to all three methods of punishment (punitive damages, terms
of imprisonment, and the death penalty), but giving teeth to this limitation only when the
defendant might be deprived of life or money, but not when liberty is at stake. 73 The
Court has continued these different approaches despite the fact that the proportionality
principle stems from the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth Amendment for both
the death penalty and for prison terms.
Most recently, in Roper v. Simmons,74 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
began his analysis of whether the death penalty was disproportionate when imposed on a
juvenile under the age of eighteen, with an inter-jurisdictional comparative analysis.
While Justice Kennedy relied on language in death penalty cases that instructs courts to
consider the extent to which there is a "national consensus" 75 as to imposition of the
death penalty in particular circumstances, this analysis involves comparing the laws in
other states. The Roper analysis is another example of the significance of comparative
analysis in proportionality review, yet this form of analysis is relevant, according to
Harmelin and Ewing, involving prison terms, only if a court first determines a prison
term is "grossly disproportionate." While Justice Kennedy was the architect of the
threshold approach in Harmelin, he has yet to explain why a comparative analysis is not
71. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-96.
72. 538 U.S. at28-31.
73. See Chemerinsky, supra n. 1; Lee, supra n. 1, at 695-99 (explaining why the jurisprudence in the areas
of capital and noncapital cases is "messy and meaningless" because the Court inconsistently applies a
comparative analysis, and asserting that the "lazy slogan that 'death is different' hardly amounts to a principled
distinction"); Van Cleave, supra n. 1, at 272 (urging consistency).
74. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
75. Id. at 562-63 (quoting Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (finding no national consensus
prohibiting the execution of seventeen year old offenders)). Roper overruled Stanford. Id. at 574-75.
2008]
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relevant to a review of prison sentences, other than to state that "[b]ecause the death
penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special
force." 76 Yet, this does not explain why deference to a legislature's determination of the
appropriate punishment is less warranted in this context. Rather, the nature of the
punishment should be among the factors a court considers when evaluating a punishment
for excessiveness, and not dictate the analytical method by which a court reviews such
punishments. 7 7 Indeed, it is not at all clear why evaluation of a term of imprisonment for
excessiveness should not also include such a comparative analysis. Instead, terms of
imprisonment are the one form of punishment that, as a practical matter, is not subject to
proportionality review. While the Court has left a sliver of an opening for the
hypothetical life imprisonment sentence for a traffic violation, 78 it has made it clear that
an Eighth Amendment challenge to a term of imprisonment is next to impossible.
IV. Is "REASONABLENESS" THE NEW PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE?
AND, WHERE IS THE JURY?
While the Court pursued a course of virtually gutting the Eighth Amendment of
any proportionality principle as to terms of imprisonment, it began to vigorously enforce
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial with its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey.
79
In Apprendi, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment prohibited the State from
imposing an enhanced sentence, exceeding the statutory maximum sentence allowed for
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, based on a judge's finding that the
defendant "acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." 8° The
Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment requires that "any fact [other than that of a
prior conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
81
In Blakely v. Washington,82 the Court found that the constitutional standard set out
in Apprendi was violated when state law allowed a judge to impose an "exceptional
sentence" exceeding the statutory maximum when the judge found that the defendant had
acted with "deliberate cruelty." 83 According to the Court, the aggravating fact leading to
an increased sentence must be found by a jury. 84  Finding "no distinction of
constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
76. Id. at 568.
77. 1 have made this argument before. Van Cleave, supra n. 1, at 272-73. But see Richard S. Frase,
Excessive Prison Sentences, Pun Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What? 89
Minn. L. Rev. 571, 631-32 (2005) (suggesting that courts could apply different levels of scrutiny to different
categories of punishments, but also pointing out the disadvantages of such an approach).
78. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
79. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
80. Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000)).
81. Id. at 490.
82. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
83. Id. at 300 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (West 2000)).
84. Id. at 301 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
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Washington procedures" at issue in Blakely,85 in Booker, the Court held that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, to the extent that they mandated a
sentence exceeding a base Guidelines range based on judicial fact-finding by a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than jury fact-finding based on the standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt. 86  The Court remedied this situation by rendering the
Guidelines advisory, thus judges are no longer tied to sentencing ranges set out in the
Guidelines. However, courts are to consider these ranges as well as the sentencing goals
set out in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which include: Consideration of "the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant."
87
The Court's decision in Cunningham88 sent shock waves through California's
determinate sentencing law. Cunningham was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a
child under age fourteen. California law set out three possible sentences, six, twelve, and
sixteen years. The law required the middle term of twelve years unless the judge
determined that certain aggravating facts were present. The judge found six aggravating
facts and sentenced Cunningham to sixteen years imprisonment. 89 The Court concluded
that this sentencing scheme violated the Apprendi line of cases because it mandated a
more severe sentence based on fact finding by a judge rather than a jury. 90 However,
analogous to the nuanced distinction made by the Court in Philip Morris between
directly punishing a defendant for harm suffered by strangers to the litigation, which is
not permitted, and considering such harm to evaluate reprehensibility, which is
permitted, the Cunningham majority highlights a subtle distinction made in Booker. The
Court stated that, on the one hand, it has "never doubted the authority of a judge to
exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range." 9 1 On the
other hand, if the structure of a sentencing scheme is such that a more severe sentence
can be imposed only when a judge finds certain facts, it violates the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. Therefore, if a sentencing scheme permits, but does not require, a
more severe sentence based on aggravating facts, a judge who imposes a harsher
sentence may do so pursuant to her exercise of discretion and no jury finding beyond a
reasonable doubt is required. 92  Thus, the Booker remedy of treating the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory cures the Sixth Amendment
structural defect because post-Booker a judge may impose a sentence outside the
Guidelines range by considering both mitigating and aggravating facts and exercising her
judicial discretion. It is not entirely clear how this subtle distinction is to operate. In
85. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
86. Id. at 243-44.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
88. 127 S. Ct. 856.
89. Id. at 860-61.
90. Id. at 868.
91. id. at 866 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 233).
92. The California legislature responded to the Court's decision in Cunningham by amending the state's
determinate sentencing law. This amendment makes the upper sentence the statutory maximum and allows the
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addition, in Booker, the Court concluded that a de novo standard of review no longer
applied; rather, reviewing courts must now evaluate sentences under a standard of
reasonableness to determine whether the sentencing judge abused her discretion.9 3
Within this remedial component of the Booker decision, it seems that substantive review
of terms of imprisonment has arguably reentered the realm of judicial consideration, but
without a constitutional dimension.
During the 2006-2007 Term, the Court has acknowledged that the advisory nature
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, post-Booker, provides judges with greater
discretion to determine an appropriate sentence. In Rita, the defendant was convicted of
making two false statements under oath to a grand jury.9 4  The pre-sentence report
recommended a base level 20 and criminal history category I, resulting in a sentence of
thirty-three to forty-one months imprisonment. 95 Rita argued for a lower sentence based
on his poor "[p]hysical condition, [his] vulnerability in prison [due to his prior
involvement in criminal justice work,] and his military service." 96 The judge concluded
that he was "unable to find that the [report's recommended] sentencing guidelines
range ... is an inappropriate guideline range" and that "it [was] appropriate to enter" a
sentence at the bottom of the range, thirty-three months imprisonment. 97 The Supreme
Court determined that a reviewing court may conclude that a sentence within the
Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. The Court justified allowing such a
presumption because it "reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering
a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing
Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the
particular case." 9 8 As to the requirement that a sentencing judge state his reasons for a
imposing a particular sentence, the Court stated that this does not require "a full opinion
in every case." 99 While the Court acknowledged that the sentencing judge "might have
said more"'100 to explain why he declined to impose a sentence that was lower than the
Guidelines range, as Rita had requested, that facts indicate that the judge considered the
evidence and the arguments, and this is sufficient.
For purposes of this paper, Rita is relevant for how the Court's conclusion that a
jury must find any facts that justify a harsher sentence has led the Court back to the
question of how to evaluate terms of imprisonment. Booker represents the apex of the
Court's vigilant protection of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, but the remedy
cobbled by the Court may have severely limited the jury trial right articulated in the
Apprendi and Booker line of cases and at the same time left defendants without
93. 543 U.S. at 261.
94. 127 S. Ct. at 2459.
95. Id. at 2461.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2462. For a comparison of this sentence to that imposed on Lewis Libby, see Douglas A.
Berman, Looking at the Libby Case from a Sentencing Perspective, 20 Fed. Senten. Rep. 1 (2007); Keith
Heidmann, Can I Get What Lewis Libby Got? 20 Fed. Senten. Rep. 23 (2007).
98. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463. See also Stephanos Bibas, Rita v. United States Leaves More Questions Open
Than It Answers, 20 Fed. Senten. Rep. 28 (2007) (raising the question of how Rita figures into the Court's prior
Sixth Amendment cases).
99. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468.
100. Id. at 2469.
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meaningful review of sentences imposed. As Justice Scalia stated, the Court's opinion
does not explain "why, under the advisory Guidelines scheme, judge-found facts are
never legally necessary to justify the sentence."'101 In other words, now that the
Guidelines are advisory, how is a reviewing court to determine whether a sentence
imposed is one that is based only on facts found by a jury, rather than a sentence the
judge arrived at in the exercise of her discretion? After all, the crux of the Apprendi line
of cases is that the Sixth Amendment requires that any punishment above the statutory
range be based on facts found by a jury. As Justice Scalia points out, the majority of the
Court seems to acknowledge that judges will issue sentences based on aggravating facts
not found by a jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Booker remedy attempted
to preserve a large degree of uniformity in sentencing, and thus avoid a return to purely
indeterminate sentencing. However, the risk was that sentencing courts would treat the
Guidelines as mandatory, rather than advisory, as a practical matter and thus result in
sentences that violate or threaten the jury right.102 Justice Souter raised the concern that
a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences will only exacerbate
the risk that sentencing judges will apply the Guidelines in a way that is in fact
mandatory. 103 He asks, "just what has been accomplished in real terms by all the
judicial labor imposed by Apprendi and its associated cases[?]" 104 What indeed?
V. LOOKING FORWARD-PROPORTIONALITY IN THE 2007-2008 SUPREME COURT TERM
The Court turns to the question of proportionality again in the current term. On
February 27, 2008, the Court heard oral arguments in the In re: The Exxon Valdez case in
which Exxon appealed a punitive damages award of $2.5 billion, which is lower than the
$5 billion imposed by the jury, and lower than the reduction made by the district court to
$4.5 billion. 10 5 The litigation arose after the 1989 grounding of Exxon's oil tanker and
spill of 11 million gallons of oil in Prince William Sound.106 The punitive damages
were based on the finding that
Exxon knew [that Captain] Hazelwood was an alcoholic, knew that he had failed to
maintain his treatment regimen and had resumed drinking, knew that he was going on
board to command its supertankers after drinking, yet let him continue to command the
Exxon Valdez through the icy and treacherous waters of Prince William Sound.]
0 7
On appeal, Exxon disputes the numerator used by the court to calculate the ratio between
the punitive damages and the compensatory damages. Exxon also disputes the figure
used by the district court to represent the harm that it caused. 108 The district court added
the compensatory damages awarded in this case "to the actual judgments, settlements,
101. Id. at 2475 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
102. Id. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2488.
105. 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), cert granted, Exxon Ship. Co. v Baker, 128 S. Ct. 492 (2007).
106. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, History, Frequently Asked Questions about the Spill,
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/History/FAQ.cfm (accessed Mar. 16, 2008).
107. Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d at 613.
108. Id. at 618-23.
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and other recoveries various plaintiffs obtained as a result of the spill,"'10 9 to arrive at a
total of $513.1 million in actual harm caused by Exxon. Exxon argued that the court
should subtract from the numerator money Exxon had paid out in the form of
settlements, and other judgments. 110 The Ninth Circuit agreed that "'generally'
prepayments should not be used as part of the calculation of harm" to encourage
settlement before trial, but concluded that this is not a "mechanical arithmetic limit."
1 I II
Exxon Valdez raises an issue that the Supreme Court has not focused on-how courts are
to calculate the numerator to determine the ratio between the punitive damages award
and the harm caused. Commentators have pointed out that the "ratio guidepost" is
problematic precisely because its calculation depends on what is included in the
numerator. For example, Justice Ginsburg explained that TXO Production can be
characterized as upholding punitive damages "526 times greater than the actual damages
awarded by the jury," but by recalculating the compensatory damages to include the
"potential loss to the plaintiffs had the defendant succeeded in its illicit scheme, the
Court could describe the relevant ratio in TXO as 10 to ."' 112 In Haslip, the Court
described the ratio as "more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages, [and as]
more than 200 times [the plaintiffs] out-of-pocket expenses."' 113 After State Farm,
when a "[s]ingle-digit multiplier[ ] [is] more likely to comport with due process," 114 how
a court calculates the numerator is critical. Exxon Valdez provides the Court with an
opportunity to clarify exactly what aspects of harm caused by the defendant are to be
included in the numerator. Does this include potential harm as the court in TXO
considered? Does this include dollar amounts that represent harm, but were paid out by
the defendant in settlements and judgments arising from the same incident? Of course,
the lower the dollar amount arrived at to represent the harm caused, along with the
presumption for a single-digit multiplier, the lower the ultimate punitive damages award
will be.
The issue of proportionality is also before the Court in the Louisiana case, State v.
Kennedy.115 This case raises the question of whether a state may impose the death
penalty for an offense in which no death resulted, specifically for the rape of a child.
Thirty years ago, the Court determined that the death penalty was disproportionate to the
crime of rape of an adult woman. 116 The Court will have to decide as a categorical
matter whether capital punishment is constitutional for the rape of a child when no death
occurred. The Court has previously found violations of the Eighth Amendment as to
other categories of offenses,117 and as to categories of defendants.118 The Court is likely
109. ld. at619.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 620 (quoting In re: the Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001)).
112. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 430 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 453); id.
atn. 1.
113. 499 U.S. 1,23 (1991).
114. 538 U.S. at 426.
115. 957 So. 2d 757 (La. 2007), cert granted, Kennedy v. La., 128 S. Ct. 829 (2008).
116. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
117. Enmund, 458 U.S. 782 (Eighth Amendment violation when the death penalty is imposed on a defendant
convicted of felony murder, but who had not killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill).
118. Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (Eighth Amendment violation when the death penalty is imposed on a defendant
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to follow the analysis used in Roper discussed above and begin with an inter-
jurisdictional comparative analysis as part of its evaluation of a national consensus.
There does not seem to be any reason to think that the Court will deviate from its
pattern of giving teeth to proportionality review of death penalty sentences and of
punitive damages awards. Cases involving excessive terms of imprisonment continue to
escape any proportionality review since the Court has determined that it is more
important to defer to legislative determinations in that context. Indeed, if there is any
shift in the jurisprudence of proportionality it is more likely to be in the form of greater
deference to a state legislature's conclusion that the ultimate penalty is warranted even
when the harm caused by the defendant has not involved death. Striking the punitive
damages award in Exxon Valdez, while allowing the death penalty for child rape, would
illustrate dramatically the need for the Court to explain the inconsistencies among its
different paths of proportionality jurisprudence. However, it is unlikely that such an
explanation will be forthcoming.
who was under the age of eighteen when he committed the murder); Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Eighth
Amendment violation when the death penalty is imposed on a mentally retarded defendant).
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